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1  | INTRODUC TION
After a disastrous event, public outcry often follows over who is to 
blame. Think for example of the sinking of the MS Estonia cruise 
ferry in 1994, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010, or the Ponte Marandi bridge collapse in Genoa (Italy) in 
2018, just to name a few. In such cases, people want to know what 
caused the event and whether there is someone to blame and to 
be held legally liable for the consequences. In this regard, corporate 
“disasters” are not much different. After the Enron bankruptcy in 
2001, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and more recently 
the Volkswagen emissions scandal, the public (as well as the author-
ities) demanded thorough investigations and that those to blame 
were held accountable. Also in less high-profile cases of business 
failure do the local communities or creditors typically appeal for a 
thorough investigation into the causes of the event. In some juris-
dictions, an investigation into the causes of a company's failure is 
even mandatory.
In such investigations, attention often centers on the role of the 
company's directors to for example determine whether there has 
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Abstract
Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and dam-
aged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the com-
pany's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can 
be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse 
outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investiga-
tors such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome 
bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to 
advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also 
examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and 
outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate 
that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and 
perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that 
these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that 
humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the 
many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy 
amidst the COVD-19 pandemic.
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been a breach of fiduciary duties, wrongful trading, or gross business 
misjudgments.1 If such wrongful conduct is, indeed, proven, direc-
tors can be held liable for damages, and creditors thus (partly) re-
claim their losses. Investigations into a director's conduct are 
normally carried out by professionals who have a legal or financial 
background (or both), such as lawyers, trustees, insolvency practi-
tioners, liquidators, or forensic accountants, possibly in conjunction 
with an investigating judge/magistrate (in inquisitorial systems).
It is imperative that these legal professionals assess a direc-
tors’ actions in relation to an adverse event in an objective and 
reliable manner. Accurate and unbiased assessments are import-
ant for general reasons such as predictability of the relevant leg-
islation (i.e., legal certainty) and resultant trust in legal systems, 
but also because being held liable for a company's downfall can 
have detrimental effects on a director's personal well-being 
(Jenkins et al., 2014; Kesteren et al., 2017; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). 
Additionally, from a professional point of view, reputations are at 
risk, and liability for all creditor claims on the bankrupt estate in 
some cases far exceed insurance coverage and can, therefore, lead 
to dire financial circumstances in the private sphere. Hence, an ac-
curate assessment of a director's conduct in relation to an adverse 
event is paramount.
However, there is good reason to believe that the accurate 
assessment of a director's conduct and its relation to a corporate 
mishap can be jeopardized by the fact that such assessments are 
made in hindsight when the investigators and legal decision mak-
ers are aware of the adverse outcome. Judgments made in hindsight 
are notoriously susceptible to hindsight bias, which is the phenom-
enon of perceiving past events as more foreseeable and/or inevi-
table than was realistically the case prior to the event's unfolding 
(Fischhoff, 1975). Additionally, when judging in hindsight people 
tend to let the consequences of a certain decision or action unjus-
tifiably affect their judgments regarding the quality of that action 
or decision, such that these are perceived more negatively after a 
negative outcome than after a positive outcome (i.e., outcome bias; 
Baron & Hershey, 1988). As a result of hindsight bias and outcome 
bias, decisions made by a director that seemed reasonable at the 
time, might in case of a bad outcome (e.g., company going bankrupt) 
be perceived as negligent.
That being said, it currently remains an open question whether 
legal professionals who investigate and evaluate a director's conduct 
are, indeed, affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias. The current 
paper's primary goal is to address this question, as we posit that pre-
vious research on hindsight bias does not fully allow for extrapola-
tion to the current context of directors’ liability cases. An additional, 
more explorative goal of the current paper is to investigate the rela-
tionship between legal professionals’ beliefs regarding free will and 
their susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias. We believe 
investigating this relationship might help improve our understanding 
of the drivers behind these biases.
1.1 | Hindsight bias in legal judgments
The first empirical evidence for hindsight bias was provided by 
Baruch Fischhoff who originally dubbed it as “creeping determin-
ism”, pointing to the idea that once actualized, events appear as 
though they had to happen, given the seemingly logical and linear 
causal chain leading up to the event's occurrence (Fischhoff, 1975; 
Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; for reviews of the hindsight bias literature, 
see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault et al., 2004; 
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Roese & Vohs, 2012). Recent research 
has suggested that hindsight bias is not a unified concept and is 
rather best regarded as an umbrella term for three separate, al-
beit related, biases, each with different causal mechanisms (e.g., 
Blank et al., 2008; Kelman et al., 1998; Nestler et al., 2010; Roese 
& Vohs, 2012). Specifically, hindsight bias can refer to (1) a distorted 
memory of previous events or judgments, (2) subjective beliefs of an 
event's inevitability (“it had to happen”), or (3) subjective beliefs of 
an event's foreseeability (“I knew it would happen”). For the law, the 
most relevant component of hindsight bias is that in foreseeability 
judgments.
The causes of hindsight bias in perceived foreseeability can be 
found in cognitive (i.e., sense-making), meta-cognitive (i.e., fluency 
in sense-making), and motivational processes (Roese & Vohs, 2012). 
In contrast to other cognitive biases that operate largely in an au-
tomatic and unconscious fashion, hindsight bias relies on an im-
portant part in conscious deliberation and sense-making processes. 
Specifically, an event appears to have been more inevitable and fore-
seeable when it is easier to make sense of (Blank & Nestler, 2007; 
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Wilson & Gilbert, 2008) or when the causal 
chain leading up to the event is easily identifiable and straightfor-
ward (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; Wasserman et al., 1991; 
Yopchick & Kim, 2012). Hindsight bias in perceived foreseeability 
can also result from meta-cognitive and motivational processes. 
Specifically, when one reflects on how a certain course of events 
might ultimately have turned out differently and one experiences 
difficulties conceiving such counterfactuals, this meta-cognitive ex-
perience is used to infer that the actual outcome must have been the 
most likely one and that this outcome was, therefore, foreseeable 
(Sanna & Schwarz, 2007). With regard to motivational processes, 
people who have a stronger need for control or closure are generally 
more motivated to perceive the world in a predictable and orderly 
fashion and are, therefore, likely to be motivated to retrospectively 
judge events as having been foreseeable (Musch, 2003; Musch & 
Wagner, 2007; Tykocinski, 2001).
Evidence suggests that hindsight bias can manifest itself in the 
courtroom (for reviews of hindsight bias in legal decision making, 
see Giroux et al., 2016; Harley, 2007). In their seminal paper, Kamin 
and Rachlinski (1995) demonstrated among a sample of prospec-
tive jurors that precautionary measures to prevent damage from 
 1There are several differences across jurisdictions regarding the degrees of freedom that 
directors typically get (for a comparison of the legislation across jurisdictions, see INSOL 
International, 2017), but a universality across legal systems is that for a director to be 
held liable, negligence and a causal link with the damages needs to be established.
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possible flooding appear insufficient in hindsight, whereas in fore-
sight (i.e., when the participants in the study were unaware flood-
ing occurred) these measures were deemed largely appropriate (for 
similar findings, see Casper et al., 1988; Hastie et al., 1999; LaBine & 
LaBine, 1996; Lowe & Reckers, 1994). Furthermore, a meta-analysis 
suggests that there appears to be no difference between experts 
and non-experts with regard to hindsight bias (Guilbault et al., 2004; 
see also Blendon et al., 2002; Caplan et al., 1991). Indeed, it ap-
pears that hindsight bias is not limited to mock jurors and can affect 
professional judges as well (Anderson et al., 1993, 1997; Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2001, 2007; Jennings et al., 1998; Oeberst & 
Goeckenjan, 2016).
Despite this evidence of hindsight bias affecting legal decision 
making, we believe the question of whether professional legal in-
vestigators will succumb to hindsight bias when conducting inves-
tigations into directors’ conduct warrants further investigation, for 
several reasons. First, it is unclear to what extent previous research 
on hindsight bias can be generalized to the current context of di-
rectors’ liability, as research investigating hindsight bias among legal 
professionals is scarce, generally suffers from low statistical power, 
and has shown mixed results. That is, in contrast to the literature 
discussed so far, some studies did not find any effects of outcome 
information on legal professionals’ judgments. For example, Wistrich 
et al. (2005) observed that judges were able to ignore inadmissible 
outcome information when assessing probable cause for a police 
search (see also Rachlinski et al., 2011). Moreover, Hastie and Viscusi 
(1998) found that judges were less affected by hindsight bias than 
mock jurors. We, therefore, believe the small but growing body of re-
search on hindsight bias in legal decision making could benefit from 
further, high-powered research.
Second, the research on hindsight bias among legal professionals 
so far has focused solely on judges. However, in the current con-
text of directors’ liability, other legal professionals such as trustees, 
insolvency lawyers, and insolvency practitioners play a more prom-
inent role as they most often lead the investigations into directors’ 
conduct. Moreover, whereas judges are typically generalists dealing 
with a range of different cases in different legal domains, the legal 
professionals investigating directors’ conduct in liability investiga-
tions are specialists in the sense that a significant portion of their 
work focuses on investigations into insolvent businesses and other 
corporate mishaps that might result in personal liability for direc-
tors and officers. We deem it worthwhile, therefore, to investigate 
whether this specific group of legal professionals is affected by hind-
sight bias.
Finally, applied research is needed to inform public policy and 
legislation that aim to address the risk of hindsight bias in directors’ 
liability cases. In the United States, for example, the business judg-
ment rule limits the liability of directors and officers for decisions 
that turned out badly, as courts recognize that “after the fact litigation 
is a most imperfect device” and “a reasoned decision may seem a wild 
hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge” 
(Rachlinski, 1998, p. 621; see also Arkes & Schipani, 1994). In Europe, 
where new legislation is being developed to harmonize insolvency 
laws across its member states (e.g., European Commission, 2016; 
Fletcher & Wessels, 2012), discussions concerning the potential ef-
fects of hindsight bias are taking place. However, as of yet, no re-
search has directly tested whether legal professionals’ evaluations of 
directors’ actions are, indeed, susceptible to hindsight bias. Hence, 
recent developments in the area of insolvency law in Europe as well 
as existing regulations across the globe ask for thorough research so 
as to allow for evidence-based policies and legislation.
Al in all, we consider it worthwhile to investigate whether legal 
professionals who investigate directors’ conduct in light of a poten-
tial liability claim are in fact susceptible to hindsight bias. We, there-
fore, aim to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Professional legal investigators’ ex-post judgments of the 
foreseeability of a corporate bankruptcy are higher than their ex-
ante foreseeability judgments.
1.2 | Outcome bias in legal judgments
In addition to affecting judgments of foreseeability, judgments made 
in hindsight might also affect judgments of decision quality. When 
people evaluate others’ actions while knowing its consequences, it 
is common that the consequences are factored into the evaluation 
of the actions. As a result, the same action is evaluated more nega-
tively when it results in a negative outcome than when a positive 
outcome ensues (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Gino et al., 2009; Lipshitz 
& Barak, 1995; Mazzocco et al., 2004; Robbennolt, 2000). Although 
very similar to hindsight bias in that outcome information unjustifi-
ably affects the evaluation of events in the past, a bias in evaluations 
of decision quality constitutes outcome bias rather than hindsight 
bias.
In a recent study investigating outcome bias in legal decision 
making, judges were found to perceive a particular individual to have 
acted more intentionally when that person's actions resulted in a 
severely bad outcome versus a moderately bad outcome (Kneer & 
Bourgeois-Gironde, 2017). Hence, outcome information can distort 
legally relevant judgments even of those who have received exten-
sive training to not let irrelevant factors affect their judgment (see 
also Anderson et al., 1997; Charron & Lowe, 2008). It, therefore, fol-
lows that professional legal investigators who are tasked with eval-
uating a director's conduct and its relation to incurred damages by 
the company's shareholders or creditors might also succumb to the 
bias’ influence. For example, when a strategic decision made by a 
director ends badly, they might erroneously conclude the decision 
was a poor one even though other factors might have contributed 
more strongly to the unfortunate outcome. In fact, the unwanted 
consequences might have happened despite rather than because of 
the director's actions.
Even though outcome bias in professional legal investigators’ 
judgments might manifest in multiple areas, in the present paper 
we focus on the two most relevant elements. First, we test whether 
the strategic decisions made by a director are perceived more 
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negatively in hindsight than in foresight, as this might lead investi-
gators to believe the director made a gross business misjudgment or 
even breached fiduciary duties toward shareholders and creditors. 
Second, we test whether ultimately the investigators believe more 
strongly that a director is legally responsible when they know the 
business went bankrupt (i.e., hindsight judgment) compared to when 
they are still ignorant of the company's fate (i.e., foresight judg-
ments). We formulated the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a Professional legal investigators’ ex-post evaluations of 
the quality of a director's actions are more negative than their 
ex-ante judgments.
Hypothesis 2b Professional legal investigators’ ex-post attributions 
of a director's legal responsibility are higher than their ex-ante 
attributions.
1.3 | Punitiveness, free will beliefs, and judging 
in hindsight
Even though the discovery of hindsight bias was already made four 
decades ago, research is still trying to fully understand its underly-
ing mechanisms. We posit that research on individual differences 
in hindsight bias might help achieve this goal. Thus far, research on 
individual differences in hindsight bias is relatively scarce, shows 
mixed results, and generally suffers from (very) low statistical 
power (Musch & Wagner, 2007). The same applies to the literature 
on outcome bias in that little research has been devoted to un-
derstanding the underlying mechanisms and no reliable individual 
differences have been identified. Thus far, factors that have been 
found to cause outcome bias are failing to sufficiently take into ac-
count the decision quality itself (Baron & Hershey, 1988), the pro-
cess that led to the decision (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), or an 
agent's intentions (Sezer et al., 2016). Therefore, a second, more 
exploratory goal of this study is to investigate individual differ-
ences in hindsight bias and outcome bias with the aim of improv-
ing our understanding of these biases. Specifically, we investigate 
whether the desire to blame and punish wrongdoers can predict 
professional legal investigators’ susceptibility to hindsight bias and 
outcome bias.
Traditionally, it was believed that attributions of blame and pun-
ishment are the end product of careful consideration of relevant fac-
tors, such as whether an individual intentionally brought about an 
adverse outcome and whether the outcome was foreseeable (e.g., 
Malle et al., 2014). However, evidence is accumulating for an alter-
native position suggesting that blame processes can actually operate 
in the opposite direction. That is, initial moral judgments and pu-
nitive inclinations can affect subsequent sense-making processes 
such that these are biased to be consistent with the initial judgment. 
Such motivated cognition processes entail that one engages in bi-
ased sense-making and information processing with the aim to ar-
rive at thedesired conclusion, all the while being under the illusion of 
acting objectively (e.g., Kunda, 1990; Nadler & Mueller, 2017; Sood 
& Darley, 2012).
A classic example of moral judgments driving perceptions of 
important constituents of blame is that provided by Alicke (1992), 
who conducted several experiments that demonstrated that peo-
ple assign a stronger causal role to an individual who was involved 
in a traffic accident when that individual was speeding to hide a 
stash of cocaine than when that individual was speeding to hide an 
anniversary gift for his parents. Alicke's blame-validation account 
of moral judgments is in line with Haidt’s (2001) social intuition-
ist approach to moral judgment, which also highlights the influ-
ence that initial moral reactions have on subsequent judgments. 
Indeed, ample empirical evidence exists to support the notion that 
moral reactions can drive subsequent perceptions of for example 
intentionality, causal control, legal responsibility, and foreseeabil-
ity (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Ask & Pina, 2011; Knobe, 2005; Nadler & 
McDonnell, 2012; for reviews, see Ditto et al., 2009; Feigenson & 
Park, 2006; Sood, 2013).
We, therefore, put forward the possibility that once legal profes-
sionals are made aware of a company's downfall and collateral dam-
age, their initial moral reactions might activate blame-validation and 
motivated reasoning processes, leading them to judge the director's 
role in the downfall in such a way that it is coherent with their initial 
moral reaction. In other words, it may be legal professionals’ motiva-
tion to blame and punish that drives hindsight bias and outcome bias, 
such that they judge a director's strategic plans more negatively, the 
bankruptcy as more foreseeable, and the director to be more re-
sponsible for the bankruptcy compared with when they are unaware 
of the company's downfall. If hindsight bias and outcome bias can, 
indeed, stem from blame-validation processes, it follows that people 
with a stronger tendency to moralize events and condemn and pun-
ish wrongdoing should display a stronger bias. We can, therefore, ex-
pect an association between people's punitive inclinations (i.e., their 
motivation to blame and punish) and their susceptibility to hindsight 
bias and outcome bias.
A useful proxy of people's punitive inclinations is their belief 
in free will. People with stronger free will beliefs appear to (1) be 
more intolerant of unethical behavior, (2) be more punitive, and (3) 
show greater support for severe criminal punishment and retribu-
tive punishment (Carey & Paulhus, 2013; Martin et al., 2017; Savani 
et al., 2011; Shariff et al., 2014; Stroessner & Green, 1990). Indeed, it 
seems that free will beliefs are closely tied to people's innate needs 
to hold others morally responsible for their actions and to condemn 
and punish wrongdoers (Clark et al., 2014). Therefore, if people's pu-
nitive desires can, indeed, cause hindsight bias to manifest, a relation 
between free will beliefs and hindsight bias should be observed.
In hindsight, legal professionals who believe more strongly in 
free will might show higher ratings of foreseeability, evaluate a di-
rector's actions more negatively, and attribute more legal responsi-
bility to the director than those who show less commitment to the 
notion of free will, due to the former's stronger punitive predisposi-
tions. Based on this line of reasoning, we formulated the following 
hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 3 Free will beliefs are positively associated with hindsight 
bias and outcome bias.
1.4 | The present studies
To summarize, the current research aims (1) to investigate whether 
legal professionals tasked with investigating directors’ conduct fol-
lowing a corporate mishap are affected by hindsight bias and out-
come bias, and (2) to provide a first test of the potential relationship 
between people's punitiveness (as measured by their belief in free 
will) and these biases.
By doing so, we aim to add to the literature in three important 
ways. First and foremost, we provide a first test of whether profes-
sional legal investigators are affected by hindsight bias and outcome 
bias when investigating a director's conduct in relation to a corpo-
rate mishap. Second, we contribute to the small but growing body of 
research investigating hindsight bias in legal judgments among pro-
fessionals (rather than lay people), which thus far has shown mixed 
results. Third, by bringing together the literature on hindsight bias, 
outcome bias, and free will beliefs, we provide the first study that 
investigates whether blame processes can drive hindsight bias and 
outcome bias and thus whether personally held beliefs regarding rel-
atively abstract concepts, such as whether or not humans have free 
will, can predict susceptibility to these biases.
We test our hypotheses in two experiments. In both studies, par-
ticipants were presented with a hypothetical bankruptcy case. Using 
a typical hypothetical hindsight bias research design (Pohl, 2007), 
half of the participants received the case with no outcome (i.e., par-
ticipants remain unaware the company went bankrupt) and the other 
half received the same case but now including the outcome (i.e., the 
company going bankrupt). Study 2 was largely identical to Study 1 
with the addition of a positive outcome condition in which partic-
ipants learned that the company was saved from bankruptcy. The 
main purposes of this second study were (1) to replicate and examine 
the robustness of the findings of Study 1, and (2) to shed light on 
potential alternative mechanisms through which the moderating role 
of free will beliefs in hindsight and outcome bias can be explained 





We aimed to conduct a highly powered study and determined, using 
G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009), that we needed 619 participants to 
have a power of 0.85 to detect a small effect (f2 = 0.02; Cohen, 1988). 
In the end, 727 professionals (553 males; 76.1%) specialized in the 
areas of insolvency law, business restructuring, and/or recovery 
participated in our online survey. Participants were members of 
INSOL Europe, which is the European organization of professionals 
who specialize in insolvency, business restructuring, and recovery. 
Participants were approached via e-mail with an invitation to partici-
pate in our study. The e-mail contained the link to the online survey 
that was built using Qualtrics (2018) online survey software.
Of all participants, 393 reported to work as an insolvency lawyer, 
144 as insolvency practitioner, 75 as turnaround consultant/man-
ager, 68 as trustee, 49 as judge, 48 as banker (of which 32 reported 
to have a legal background), 38 as academic in the legal field and 15 
chose “other.”.2 86.7% reported to investigate/decide over directors’ 
liability in their work. The average age was 47.9 (SD = 10.4) and par-
ticipants had on average 21.4 years of working experience in their 
profession. Thirty-seven different European nationalities are repre-
sented in the sample. The three countries with the greatest number 
of participants are the United Kingdom (34.8%), Germany (9.4%), and 
Romania (8.9%). Please see Section 1 of the supplementary materials 
online for a complete overview of the participants’ nationalities.
2.1.2 | Design and procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the No outcome con-
dition or the Negative outcome condition. Participants were first 
presented with a brief questionnaire to measure their belief in free 
will, after which they were presented with a business case. After the 
case, participants were asked questions regarding the three main 
variables of interest: (1) decision quality, (2) foreseeability, and (3) 
the CEO’s legal responsibility. Finally, several exploratory questions 




Participants’ belief in free will was measured using the Free Will 
Subscale of the Free Will Inventory (FWI; Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). 
The scale consists of five items (Cronbach's α = 0.80) and includes 
items such as “How people's lives unfold is completely up to them” 
and “People always have the ability to do otherwise.” Participants in-
dicated to what extent they agreed with each statement on a 7-point 
 2Participants were allowed to select more than one option, hence why the sum is larger 
than the number of participants.
 3For exploratory reasons, participants were asked (1) whether they thought that having 
knowledge of the outcome of the case should (or should have, in the Negative outcome 
condition) affect[ed] their judgments of the turnaround plan, foreseeability of the 
bankruptcy and the CEO’s role in the case, and (2) whether they thought that having 
knowledge of the outcome of the case would affect (or “affected”, in the Negative 
outcome condition) their judgments of the turnaround plan, the foreseeability of the 
bankruptcy and the CEO’s role in the case. The results of these questions can be found in 
Section 3 of the supplemental material online.
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Likert scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (7) strongly agree 
(M = 4.42, SD = 1.15).
Business case
The base case (i.e., without outcome information and therefore 
identical for both conditions; 403 words in length) described a pub-
licly listed company that was in financial difficulties and therefore 
hired a new CEO (“Cees van Gelder”) to turn the tide. In order to do 
so, the CEO designed a turnaround plan which stated the actions 
he thought needed to be taken to avoid bankruptcy and resume 
profitability. The new CEO’s turnaround plan was met with skepti-
cism by the shareholders due to the high risks involved. For partici-
pants in the No outcome condition, the case stopped here and they 
remained unaware of how it ended. Participants in the Negative 
outcome condition received an additional paragraph (63 words) de-
scribing the company went bankrupt, emphasizing the calamitous 
nature of the bankruptcy by stating the company's employees were 
left without a job, that several of the company's suppliers went 
bankrupt because they depended on the company, and that many 
small shareholders saw their assets evaporate. Section 2 of the sup-
plementary material online contains the full case used in Study 1.
Decision quality
Participants’ evaluation of the CEO’s turnaround plan (i.e., decision 
quality) was measured by asking participants to judge the CEO’s 
turnaround plan on an 11-point scale, with 1 labeled as very bad and 
11 labeled as very good. Prior to analyses, the values were recorded 
for ease of interpretation, such that a higher number reflects a more 
negative evaluation of the turnaround plan.
Foreseeability
Foreseeability was operationalized by measuring the perceived like-
lihood of bankruptcy. Participants in the No outcome condition were 
asked how likely they considered it to be that the CEO’s turnaround 
plan would result in bankruptcy, expressed in a percentage between 
0% and 100%. In the Negative outcome condition, the same ques-
tion was asked but here participants were instructed to ignore the 
information they had regarding the company's bankruptcy and in-
dicate the likelihood of bankruptcy at the time the turnaround plan 
was presented and the outcome of the case was still unknown.
Legal responsibility
The CEO’s legal responsibility for the company going bankrupt was 
measured using the following four items, which aimed to capture 
elements relevant for legal responsibility: (1) “Cees van Gelder 
acted negligently and he is accountable for APG’s bankruptcy,” 
(2) “Cees van Gelder should be held liable for APG’s bankruptcy,” 
(3) “Cees van Gelder is responsible for APG’s bankruptcy,” and (4) 
“Cees van Gelder is the cause of APG’s bankruptcy”. Participants 
answered on a 7-point Likert scale the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with 
the statements (Cronbach's α = 0.85). In the No outcome condi-
tion (i.e., in foresight), participants were asked about the CEO’s 
legal responsibility for the company's downfall, if it, indeed, went 
bankrupt.
2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Data preparation and analysis plan
Participants who did not spend sufficient time reading the case 
were excluded from the analyses. The required reading time was 
based on three standard deviations above the average reading 
speed for reading the case (M = 228 words per minute, SD = 30; 
Trauzettel-Klosinski & Dietz, 2012). Based on this criterion (76.6 s 
as the cut-off in the No outcome condition and 88.5 s in the 
Negative outcome condition) 94 participants (12.9% of the total 
sample) were excluded from analyses, resulting in a final sample 
size of 633 participants, providing a statistical power of 0.86 to 
detect a small effect.4
2.2.2 | Hindsight bias and outcome bias
A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
test for differences between the No outcome and Negative outcome 
conditions on the three dependent variables. Results are presented 
in Table 1. The multivariate test was significant, F (3, 629) = 24.93, 
p < .001, 2
p
 = 0.11, and the subsequent univariate tests indicated a 
significant difference between the two conditions for all three varia-
bles. The foreseeability was deemed higher in hindsight than in fore-
sight (confirming H1), the decision quality was rated more negatively 
in hindsight than in foresight (confirming H2a), and the participants 
 4The median time spent reading the case was 165.4 s for the No outcome condition and 
178.6 for the Negative outcome condition. The median time spent on the entire survey 









M (SD) M (SD)
Decision quality 4.83 (2.04) 6.19 (2.07) 69.06 <.001 0.10
Foreseeability 48.47 (17.60) 52.08 (16.14) 6.91 .009 0.01
Legal responsibility 2.39 (0.95) 2.82 (1.10) 26.59 <.001 0.04
TA B L E  1   Descriptive statistics and 
significance tests for the univariate 
analyses of Study 1
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also attributed more responsibility to the CEO in hindsight than in 
foresight (confirming H2b).
2.2.3 | Free will beliefs moderating hindsight 
bias and outcome bias
To investigate the moderating role of free will beliefs (FWB), we used 
Hayes' PROCESS (2013) for the moderation analyses (10,000 boot-
strap samples). For the predictor variable Outcome Condition, the 
No outcome condition was coded as 0 and the Negative outcome 
condition as 1. Significant interaction effects between Outcome 
Condition and FWB were found for the dependent variables deci-
sion quality, ΔR2 = 0.01, ΔF (1, 629) = 6.56, p = .01, b = 0.36, t(629) = 
2.56, p = .01, and legal responsibility, ΔR2 = 0.01, ΔF (1, 629) = 5.57, 
p = .02, b = 0.17, t(639) = 2.36, p = .02.
Probing the interaction effects with simple slopes analyses 
revealed that for decision quality, the difference between the No 
outcome and Negative outcome condition was significant for both 
those with weaker free will beliefs (−1 SD) and those with stronger 
free will beliefs (+1 SD). However, the difference was almost twice as 
large for those with stronger free will beliefs, b = 1.79, t(629) = 7.75, 
p < .001, d = 0.62, than for those with weaker free will beliefs, b = 
0.95, t(629) = 4.13, p < .001, d = 0.33.
For judgments of the CEO’s legal responsibility, the difference 
between the two outcome conditions was almost three times as 
large for those with stronger free will beliefs, b = 0.61, t(629) = 5.28, 
p < .001, d = 0.42, than for those with weaker free will beliefs, for 
whom there was no statistically significant effect, b = 0.22, t(629) = 
1.94, p = .05, d = 0.15.
Even though the same pattern was observed for the likelihood 
judgments (i.e., significant hindsight bias for the group with a stron-
ger belief in free will but not for the group with weaker free will 
beliefs), the interaction between Outcome Condition and free will 
beliefs did not reach statistical significance here, b = 1.64, t(629) = 
1.37, p = .17. Table 2 for the statistics of the moderation and simple 
slopes analyses. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of the mod-
erating effect of free will beliefs for the bias in judgments of decision 
quality and the CEO’s legal responsibility.
2.3 | Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that professional legal investigators are sus-
ceptible to hindsight bias when judging the foreseeability of bank-
ruptcy as well as to outcome bias when judging a director's actions 
and legal responsibility for the bankruptcy. Moreover, the degree 
to which these professionals believe humans have free will appears 
to predict their susceptibility to outcome bias, such that those with 
stronger free will beliefs demonstrate a larger bias. This was true for 
the evaluation of the turnaround plan (i.e., decision quality) and the 
legal responsibility of the CEO, but not for judgments of the foresee-
ability of the bankruptcy for which free will beliefs did not moderate 
the effect, although the observed pattern was in the hypothesized 
direction.
It remains unclear whether the relatively small bias in foresee-
ability judgments in Study 1 is due to our sample of profession-
als being less susceptible to hindsight bias or due to the methods 
used. Specifically, whereas we only asked how likely it was that the 
company would go bankrupt on a scale from 0% to 100%, previous 
studies typically presented several possible outcomes and asked 
participants to rate the likelihood of each in terms of a percentage, 
with the sum having to be 100%. This might explain why the hind-
sight bias was relatively small in our study (d = 0.20; Cohen, 1988), 
especially compared to previous studies as indicated by two me-
ta-analyses that found average effect sizes of d = 0.39 (Guilbault 
et al., 2004) and d = 0.35 (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991). 
It might also be a reason for why the interaction between free will 
beliefs and hindsight bias in foreseeability judgments did not reach 
statistical significance. The second study, therefore, adopted the 
TA B L E  2   Unstandardized regression weights for the effects of condition on the dependent variables for participants with a relatively 
weak belief in free will (1 SD below the mean of the FWI; −1 SD FWB) and participants with a relatively strong belief in free will (1 SD above 
the mean of the FWI; +1 SD FWB)
−1 SD FWB +1 SD FWB
Int. (SE) tb (SE) t 95% CI b (SE) t 95% CI
Decision quality 0.95 (0.23) 4.13*** 0.50, 1.40 1.79 (0.23) 7.75*** 1.34, 2.24 0.36 (0.14) 2.56*
Model: R2 = 0.110, F (3, 629) = 25.97, p < .001
Foreseeability 1.77 (1.95) 0.90 −2.07, 5.60 5.54 (1.95) 2.84** 1.71, 9.37 1.64 (1.20) 1.37
Model: R2 = 0.014, F (3, 629) = 2.99, p = .03
Legal responsibility 0.22 (0.12) 1.94 −0.00, 0.45 0.61 (0.12) 5.28*** 0.38, 0.84 0.17 (0.07) 2.36*
Model: R2 = 0.052, F (3, 629) = 11.45, p < .001
Note: “Int. (SE)” represents the regression weights and standard errors for the interaction effect (Outcome Condition × FWB) and ‘Model’ shows the 
statistics for the complete model including the interaction term.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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more commonly used method for measuring hindsight bias in fore-
seeability judgments, by providing participants with multiple scenar-
ios instead of only one.
An important goal of the second study was to test the robust-
ness of the findings in Study 1. Specifically, we aimed to replicate 
the observed hindsight bias and the moderating role of free will 
beliefs in a new international sample of legal professionals, while 
adopting a different way of measuring foreseeability judgments, 
as discussed.
The second goal of Study 2 was to test the relationship be-
tween free will beliefs and hindsight and outcome bias in a more 
complete and robust design by including a condition in which the 
case ends positively, allowing us to investigate whether free will 
beliefs can predict hindsight biases in general, or whether this 
relationship depends on the valence of the outcome. Specifically, 
Study 2 compared a No outcome condition with both a Negative 
outcome condition and a Positive outcome condition. It could for 
example be that those with stronger free will beliefs are overall 
more affected by outcome information in their judgments, in-
dependent of the valence of the outcome. If this is the case, we 
should also observe a moderating role of free will beliefs in case 
the scenario in Study 2 ends positively. In contrast, if we would 
find that free will beliefs do not moderate outcome effects in case 
of a positive ending, this would be in line with our proposed notion 
that those with stronger free will beliefs are more susceptible to 
hindsight and outcome bias because of heightened punitive incli-
nations. After all, the need to blame or punish does not come into 
play when a positive outcome ensued. Hence, adding the Positive 
outcome condition allowed us to shed more light on the proposed 





We aimed to achieve the same power as in Study 1 of 0.85 to de-
tect a small effect (f2 = 0.02; Cohen, 1988), which meant we needed 
around 310 participants per condition. With three conditions (No 
outcome, Negative outcome, Positive outcome) this amounted to 
930 participants. In the end, 1,002 legal professionals worldwide 
specialized in the areas of insolvency law, business restructuring, 
and/or recovery participated in Study 2. Participants were members 
of INSOL International, which is a worldwide federation of national 
associations of professionals who specialize in turnaround and in-
solvency. Participants were approached via e-mail with an invitation 
to participate in our study. Importantly, none of the participants of 
Study 2 had taken part in Study 1.
The participants’ average age was 46.82 (SD = 11.8) and 766 
(76.4%) were male. Participants had an average of 20.6 years of 
working experience in their profession (SD = 11.2) and 82.6% re-
ported to investigate/decide over (director) liability in their work. 
Five-hundred and nineteen respondents (51.8%) reported to work 
as (insolvency) lawyer, 210 (21%) as an accountant (of which 87.6% 
indicated to investigate and/or decide over directors’ liability), 112 
as turnaround consultant/manager (11.2%), 109 as trustee (10.9%), 
45 as insolvency practitioner (4.5%), 45 as a banker (4.5%; of which 
28 reported to investigate/decide over directors’ liability), 35 as aca-
demic in the legal field (3.5%), 28 indicated “other,” and 24 reported 
to work as a judge (2.4%). Fifty-four different nationalities are rep-
resented in the sample, with the majority of the respondents com-
ing from Australia (20.4%), the United Kingdom (14.5%), and Canada 
(10.9%). Please see Section 4 of the supplemental material online for 
a complete overview of the participants’ nationalities.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three con-
ditions: (1) No outcome, (2) Negative outcome, and (3) Positive 
outcome. In all three conditions, participants were presented with 
the same base case, but in the two outcome conditions, a para-
graph was added to the case describing either a negative ending 
(Negative outcome condition) or a positive ending (Positive out-
come condition).
F I G U R E  1   Differences between the No outcome and Negative 
outcome condition (ΔY) for both legal responsibility (Y1) and 
decision quality (Y2) at different levels of the moderator (M), i.e., for 
those with relatively low free will beliefs (M = 3.26), average free 
will beliefs (M = 4.42) and high free will beliefs (M = 5.57). ***p< 
.001
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3.1.2 | Procedure, materials, and measurements
Free will beliefs
At the start of the survey, participants received the same instruc-
tions and free will scale (Cronbach's α = 0.83) as in Study 1 (M = 4.56, 
SD = 1.26).5
Business case
Participants were presented with the same case as in Study 1, apart 
from a few minor alterations (e.g., the company's revenue, degree of 
cost-cutting listed in the CEO’s turnaround plan, and layout of the 
case).6 Please see Section 5 of the supplemental material online for 
the full case as well as the two outcome paragraphs.
Decision quality
After the case, all participants rated the quality of the turnaround 
plan (i.e., decision quality) on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) 
very bad to (7) very good. Prior to analyses, the scale was recoded 
such that a higher value reflects a more negative rating.
Legal responsibility and benevolence
Our renewed design with both a Positive outcome and Negative 
Outcome condition requires two distinct outcomes, namely legal 
responsibility and benevolence. Participants were asked three ques-
tions to judge the CEO’s legal responsibility (in case of a negative 
outcome; Cronbach's α = 0.69, which indicates sufficient internal va-
lidity for theory-testing purposes; see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) 
and three questions to measure their benevolence toward the CEO 
(in case of a positive outcome; Cronbach's α = 0.74). Benevolence 
toward the CEO was measured in Study 2 after the positive outcome 
to provide a counterpart to the legal responsibility measure after the 
negative outcome.
To measure legal responsibility, participants were asked to indi-
cate on a 7-point Likert scale the extent to which they agreed with 
three statements: (1) “[If this is how the case would end,] I believe 
Cees van Gelder should be held liable for APG’s bankruptcy,” (2) “[If 
this is how the case would end,] I believe Cees van Gelder deserves 
to be blamed for failing to save APG from bankruptcy,” and (3) “[If 
this is how the case would end,] I believe Cees van Gelder's actions 
are a direct cause of APG’s bankruptcy.” This three-item scale dif-
fered from the four-item scale used in Study 1 for two reasons. First, 
the item used in Study 1 that measured perceived negligence was 
omitted as some overlap existed with the foreseeability and deci-
sion quality measures. That is, acting negligently means failing to act 
in a reasonable way to prevent foreseeable harms, which combines 
decision quality and foreseeability. Second, the item measuring 
responsibility was omitted as responsibility has multiple dimensions 
(e.g., role responsibility, causal responsibility; Shaver, 1985) and it 
is uncertain which type of responsibility respondents had in mind 
when answering this question. The question pertaining to the de-
gree of blame participants felt the CEO deserved was added to the 
scale in Study 2.
The items measuring benevolence toward the CEO were: (1) “[If 
this is how the case would end,] the CEO deserves praise for saving 
the company from bankruptcy,” (2) “[If this is how the case would 
end,] the CEO should win the industry awards for saving the com-
pany from bankruptcy,” and (3) “[If this is how the case would 
end,] the CEO’s actions are a direct cause of the company's success-
ful turnaround.” The order of the questions was randomized.7
The text in brackets was only presented to participants in the No 
outcome condition, as to them the outcome of the case was still un-
known. In this condition, the paragraph describing the outcome con-
tingent on the question set (i.e., the negative scenario for the legal 
responsibility question set and the positive outcome for the benev-
olence question set) was presented above the question set; hence 
the phrase “if this is how the case would end.” Participants were se-
quentially presented with both questions sets (i.e., measuring legal 
responsibility and benevolence) and the order was counterbalanced 
across participants.8
Foreseeability
The perceived foreseeability of the bankruptcy was measured in two 
different ways. First, participants were presented with three scenar-
ios describing potential endings to the case: (1) the positive outcome, 
(2) the negative outcome, and (3) a neutral outcome in which the 
company did not go bankrupt, but the problems were far from solved 
and the company's future was still highly insecure. The position of 
the positive and negative scenario in the list was counterbalanced 
across participants, such that for half of the participants the positive 
scenario was listed first and the negative scenario third, and for the 
other half this order was reversed (the neutral scenario was always 
presented in the middle). For each scenario, participants were asked 
to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale how likely they believed that par-
ticular scenario to be (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). Second, on the 
next screen participants were asked to answer the same question but 
this time to express the likelihood of each scenario in terms of a per-
centage (from 0% to 100%), with the sum of the three percentages 
 5After the free will scale, participants were asked about their last night's sleep using five 
items. These questions were incorporated as part of a separate study and the details of 
these questions and the results are available upon request.
 6The base case was 432 words in length, the paragraph describing the negative ending 
contained 96 words, and the positive ending consisted of 92 words.
 7For exploratory purposes, each set also contained a fourth statement that was identical 
for both sets: “[If this is how the case would end,] I believe Cees van Gelder intentionally 
tried to save APG from bankruptcy”. We realize this item was phrased somewhat oddly 
as it is difficult to unintentionally try to achieve a certain outcome. Therefore, this item 
was excluded from the analyses.
 8The same was the case for participants in the Positive outcome condition and Negative 
outcome condition. That is, after they answered the question set contingent on the 
condition they were assigned to, they were presented with the opposite outcome and 
asked how they would judge the CEO’s role in the case if the case ended as described in 
the opposite outcome. This was done for exploratory reasons to investigate potential 
contrasting effects. The results will not be reported here. Only the answers to the 
questions pertaining to the outcome presented in the case are considered in the 
analyses.
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equaling 100%. Including two likelihood measures (Likert scale and 
percentages) allows for a more robust test of the hypothesis, as well 
as alleviate the shortcoming of the measure of the percentage, which 
implies interdependency of the percentages allocated to each of the 
three scenarios as the sum of these three had to be 100%.
Before being debriefed, participants were asked whether English 
was their native language and, if not, to what extent they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statement: “I understood the case and 
the questions completely and experienced no difficulties in answer-
ing the questions.” Participants answered on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and the mean score was 
6.41 (median = 7.00).9
3.2 | Results
3.2.1 | Data preparation and analysis plan
Similar to Study 1, participants who did not spend sufficient time 
reading the case were excluded from the analyses. We again based 
the exclusion criterion on three standard deviations above the aver-
age reading speed. This resulted in the exclusion of 166 participants 
(16.6% of the total sample), leaving a final sample size of 836 
participants.10
To test whether the order in which the scenarios and subsequent 
questions were presented in the No outcome condition affected the 
answers to these questions, a MANOVA was conducted with the sce-
nario order (negative first—positive second vs. positive first—negative 
second) as between-subjects factor and the scores for legal respon-
sibility and benevolence as dependent variables. Results showed no 
significant effect for question order, F (2, 274) = 1.88, p = .16, 2
p
 = 
0.01. Consequently, the data were collapsed across this factor.
3.2.2 | Hindsight bias and outcome bias
Legal responsibility was measured only following the negative 
outcome and benevolence only following the positive outcome. 
Decision quality was, therefore, the only outcome variable that 
was measured across conditions, allowing for a direct comparison 
between the three outcome conditions. An ANOVA with Outcome 
Condition as between-subjects variable and decision quality as 
the dependent variable returned a significant effect, F (2, 833) = 
173.54, p < .001, 2
p
 = 0.29. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc com-
parisons showed that the quality of the CEO’s turnaround plan 
was judged more negatively in the Negative outcome condition 
(M = 4.46) than in the No outcome condition (M = 3.63), p < .001, 
95% CI [0.57, 1.08] and the Positive outcome condition (M = 2.53), 
p < .001, 95% CI [1.68, 2.18]. The mean difference between the 
No outcome condition and the Positive outcome condition was 
also significant, p < .001, 95% CI [0.86, 1.35]. Hence, participants 
were susceptible to outcome bias when evaluating the director's 
actions irrespective of the valence of the outcome, further sup-
porting Hypothesis 2a.
To test for outcome effects in foreseeability, legal respon-
sibility, and benevolence, two separate MANOVAs were con-
ducted. The first compared the No outcome condition with the 
Negative outcome condition for both foreseeability measures 
and the legal responsibility measure, F (3, 549) = 14.21, p < 
.001, 2
p
 = 07. The second compared the No outcome condition 
with the Positive outcome condition for both foreseeability 
measures and the benevolence measure, F (3, 556) = 12.32, 
p < .001, 2
p
 = 0.06. Subsequent ANOVAs indicated that there 
was a significant effect of Outcome Condition (both for the 
positive and negative outcome) for both foreseeability mea-
sures, but not for legal responsibility or benevolence. Thus, 
participants were susceptible to hindsight bias in that they per-
ceived both the positive and negative outcome scenarios to be 
more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight, in support of 
Hypothesis 1. However, participants did not show an outcome 
bias when judging either legal responsibility (for the negative 
outcome) or benevolence (for the positive outcome), contra-
dicting Hypothesis 2b. Table 3 for the descriptive statistics and 
significance tests for each variable.
3.2.3 | Free will beliefs moderating hindsight 
bias and outcome bias
We again used Hayes’ PROCESS (10,000 bootstrap samples) to 
investigate the relationship between free will beliefs and the two 
biases. Separate analyses were run comparing the No outcome con-
dition with the Positive outcome condition and the No outcome 
condition with the Negative outcome condition, both with free will 
beliefs as the moderator.
Decision quality
Replicating Study 1, a significant moderation effect of free will 
beliefs was found for decision quality in case of a negative out-
come, ΔR2 = 0.01, F (1, 549) = 4.89, p = .027, b = 0.19, t(549) = 
2.21, p = .027, such that a stronger belief in free will was associ-
ated with a larger outcome bias. The difference between the No 
outcome and Negative outcome condition was again almost twice 
as large for those with stronger free will beliefs, b = 1.07, t(549) 
= 6.96, p < .001, d = 0.59, than for those with weaker free will 
beliefs, b = 0.59, t(549) = 3.83, p < .001, d = 0.33. Importantly, 
this moderation effect did not exist for decision quality in case of 
a positive outcome, ΔR2 < 0.001, F < 1. Please see Figure 2 for a 
 9Participants were again asked to what extent they believed the outcome of the case 
should and would affect their judgments (in the No outcome condition) or should and did 
affect their judgment (in the Positive and Negative outcome conditions). The analyses of 
these questions can be found in Section 6 of the supplemental material online.
 10Median duration of time spent reading the business case was 181.0 s for participants in 
the No outcome condition, 200.4 s for the Positive outcome condition, and 212.6 s for 
the Negative outcome condition. Median duration of time spent on the entire survey was 
1,176.0 s for participants in the No outcome condition, 1,153.0 for the Positive outcome 
condition, and 1,216.5 for the Negative outcome condition.
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visual presentation of the relationship between free will beliefs 
and hindsight bias for decision quality for both the negative and 
positive outcomes.
Foreseeability
In contrast to Study 1, the interaction effect between free will be-
liefs and Outcome Condition on foreseeability did reach statistical 
significance in Study 2 in case of a negative outcome, both when 
measured in percentages, ΔR2 = 0.02, F (1, 549) = 10.16, p = .002, b 
= 3.46, t(549) = 3.19, p = .002, and when measured using the Likert 
scale, ΔR2 = 0.01, F (1, 549) = 4.86, p = .028, b = 0.17, t(549) = 2.20, 
TA B L E  3   Descriptive statistics and significance tests for the univariate analyses of Study 2 testing for hindsight bias in the main variables 
of interest
DVs





M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Decision quality 
NEG
3.63 (1.30) 4.46 (1.25) 57.64 <.001 0.095
Decision quality 
POS
3.63 (1.30) 2.53 (1.13) 78.47 <.001 0.160
Foreseeability 
NEG
34.00 (15.66) 41.89 (16.63) 32.92 <.001 0.056
Foreseeability 
POS
23.72 (15.06) 30.74 (14.93) 25.92 <.001 0.063
Foreseeability 
NEG (Likert)
4.70 (1.20) 5.23 (1.04) 30.33 <.001 0.052
Foreseeability 
POS (Likert)
3.79 (1.47) 4.43 (1.33) 29.47 <.001 0.050
Benevolence 5.44 (0.84) 5.53 (0.93) 1.07 n.s. 0.002
Legal 
responsibility
3.28 (1.15) 3.32 (1.17) <1 n.s. 0.001
F I G U R E  2   Differences between the No outcome, Negative 
outcome, and Positive outcome condition (ΔY) for Decision Quality 
(Y) at different levels of the moderator (M). Specifically, for those 
with relatively low free will beliefs (M = 3.30), average free will 
beliefs (M = 4.56) and high free will beliefs (M = 5.83)
F I G U R E  3   Differences between the No outcome and Positive 
outcome condition (ΔY1) and between the No outcome condition 
and Negative outcome condition (ΔY2) for the foreseeability (here 
operationalized as the likelihood) of the negative and positive 
scenarios, respectively, at different levels of the moderator (M)
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p = .028. Regarding the percentage measure of foreseeability, partici-
pants with stronger free will beliefs demonstrated a more than three 
times larger hindsight bias, b = 12.24, t(549) = 6.35, p < .001, d = 
0.51, than those with a relatively weak belief in free will, for whom 
there was no statistically significant effect, b = 3.54, t(549) = 1.84, p 
= .067, d = 0.16. For the Likert scale measure of foreseeability, partici-
pants with stronger free will beliefs demonstrated a more than twice 
as large hindsight bias, b = 0.73, t(549) = 5.46, p < .001, d = 0.46, than 
those with a relatively weak belief in free will, b = 0.31, t(549) = 2.34, 
p = .020, d = 0.20.
Importantly, free will beliefs did not moderate the hindsight bias 
for foreseeability in case of a positive outcome when measured in 
percentages, ΔR2 = 0.001, F < 1, nor when using the Likert scale 
measure, ΔR2 < 0.001, F < 1. Please see Figures 3 and 4 for a vi-
sual representation of the relationship between free will beliefs and 
hindsight bias for the foreseeability judgments of both the positive 
and negative outcomes and Table 4 for the statistics of the modera-
tion and simple slopes analyses.
Legal responsibility and benevolence
No significant interactions between free will beliefs and Outcome 
Condition were found for legal responsibility, ΔR2 = 0.004, F = 1.98, 
p = .16, or benevolence, ΔR2 < 0.001, F < 1.
3.3 | Discussion
Study 2 successfully replicated Study 1 in that we again found a 
bias in the evaluation of the CEO’s turnaround plan and the per-
ceived foreseeability of the bankruptcy, providing further evidence 
that professional legal investigators in the context of directors’ li-
ability are affected by outcome information in their judgments. 
Additionally, the bias in the evaluation of the CEO’s turnaround 
plan was again significantly larger for those with stronger free will 
beliefs than for those with weaker free will beliefs. Whereas in 
Study 1, we did not find a moderation effect for hindsight bias in 
foreseeability judgments, in Study 2, we did find such an effect 
for both measures of foreseeability. Hence, using a more common 
way of measuring hindsight bias (i.e., presenting several alternative 
scenarios), we found a more pronounced hindsight bias in Study 2 
relative to Study 1 as well as a significant moderation effect of free 
will beliefs. Indeed, the effect sizes for hindsight bias in foresee-
ability judgments in Study 2 (d = 0.49 for the percentages meas-
ure and d = 0.47 for the Likert-scale measure) were clearly larger 
than the effect size found in Study 1 (d = 0.20) and those found in 
two meta-analyses (d = 0.39 by Guilbault et al., 2004; d = 0.35 by 
Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991).
Notably, whereas in Study 1, we found a hindsight bias in judg-
ments of legal responsibility, no such effect was found in Study 2. 
An explanation might be found in the information that was pro-
vided to participants in Study 2 regarding the outcome of the case. 
That is, hindsight bias is best tested when two groups are com-
pared in which one group is completely ignorant of any outcome 
information and the other group is fully aware of all the details 
of a particular outcome, as was the case in Study 1. In Study 2, 
however, participants in both the No outcome and Negative out-
come condition were presented with the complete bankruptcy 
scenario. The only difference between these conditions for the 
legal responsibility questions was that in the No outcome condi-
tion the scenario was presented as hypothetical and participants 
were asked how they would judge the legal responsibility of the 
CEO “if this is how the case would end.”
Another reason why there might have been diverging findings 
between Study 1 and Study 2 regarding the hindsight bias in legal 
responsibility judgments is that the two scales measuring legal re-
sponsibility differed. The scale in Study 1 included an item measur-
ing whether the participants believed the CEO acted negligently 
and that he, therefore, should be held accountable for the compa-
ny's bankruptcy, which was omitted in Study 2 as there was some 
conceptual overlap with the decision quality and foreseeability mea-
sures. It is, therefore, possible that the bias for legal responsibility 
judgments in Study 1 was for an important part driven by the negli-
gence measure.
Finally, descriptive statistics on legal responsibility indicated that 
participants in Study 2 attributed more legal responsibility for the 
bankruptcy to the director than participants in Study 1, both in fore-
sight (M = 3.28 vs. 2.39) and in hindsight (M = 3.32 vs. 2.82). Legal 
responsibility attributions in the foresight condition of Study 2 were 
F I G U R E  4   Differences between the No outcome and Positive 
outcome condition (ΔY1) and between the No outcome condition 
and Negative outcome condition (ΔY2) for the foreseeability (here 
operationalized as the likelihood) of the negative and positive 
scenarios at different levels of the moderator (M), expressed on a 
7-point Likert scale
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even higher than the hindsight attributions of Study 1. The differ-
ence in legal responsibility attributions between the two studies 
might be caused by slight differences in the business case used in 
both studies.11
Give the discussed differences between Study 1 and Study 2, it 
is unclear what exactly accounts for the inconsistent results of the 
outcome bias in legal responsibility attributions and the moderat-
ing role of free will beliefs. Combined, however, the results from 
Study 1 and Study 2 do suggest that free will beliefs can reliably 
predict susceptibility to outcome bias in post-insolvency evalua-
tions of directors’ conduct, as well as to hindsight bias in fore-
seeability judgments when these are measured using conventional 
methods.
4  | GENER AL DISCUSSION
The present article primarily aimed to investigate hindsight bias 
and outcome bias in legal judgments made by professional legal 
investigators in the context of directors’ liability. A second, more ex-
ploratory goal was whether free will beliefs can predict the degree 
to which such professionals are susceptible to these biases. Across 
two studies, we found that learning about a company's bankruptcy 
causes legal professionals to perceive the adverse outcome as more 
foreseeable and also to evaluate the company director's actions 
more negatively compared to when they are unaware the company 
went bankrupt. Additionally, we found that the degree to which legal 
professionals believe in free will predicts the extent to which they 
are affected by outcome information, such that those with stronger 
free will beliefs demonstrate a larger outcome bias in evaluations of 
directors’ conduct, as well as a larger hindsight bias in foreseeability 
judgments. We found mixed results regarding outcome bias in legal 
responsibility attributions, making it difficult to draw any definite 
conclusions.
In addition to replicating and thus testing the robustness of 
the findings of Study 1, an important goal of Study 2 was to ex-
amine the relationship between free will beliefs and the two bi-
ases in further detail by comparing the foresight condition with 
a hindsight condition in which the case had a positive ending. By 
doing so, we were able to shed further light on the mechanism 
underlying the moderating role of free will beliefs in hindsight bias 
and outcome bias. Considering the absence of any moderating 
role of free will beliefs in the case of a positive outcome, it seems 
 11Specifically, whereas the case in Study 1 described that the director implemented a 
rigorous cost-cutting program (e.g., 30% of staff laid off), the measures taken by the 
director were less rigorous in Study 2 (e.g., 15% of staff laid off). Additionally, the 
additional loans taken out by the director were larger (relative to total debt and turnover) 
in Study 2 than in Study 1.
TA B L E  4   Unstandardized regression weights (i.e., ΔY) for the effects of outcome condition (no outcome vs. positive- or negative 
outcome) on the dependent variables for participants with low free will beliefs (1 SD below the mean) and high free will beliefs (1 SD above 
the mean)
−1 SD FWB +1 SD FWB
Int. (SE) tb (SE) t 95% CI b (SE) t 95% CI
Decision quality 
NEG
0.59 (0.15) 3.83** 0.39, 0.89 1.07 (0.15) 6.96*** 0.77, 1.37 0.19 (0.09) 2.21*
Model: R2 = 0.105, F (3, 549) = 21.41, p < .001
Decision quality 
POS
−1.17 (0.14) −8.05*** −1.45, −0.88 −1.03 (0.18) −7.08*** −1.31, −0.74 −0.06 (0.10) 0.68
Model: R2 = 0.184, F (3, 556) = 41.71, p < .001
Foreseeability 
NEG
3.54 (1.93) 1.84 −0.25, 7.33 12.24 (1.93) 6.35*** 8.45, 16.03 3.46 (1.09) 3.19**
Model: R2 = 0.074, F (3, 549) = 14.62, p < .001
Foreseeability 
POS
7.94 (1.78) 4.46*** 4.44, 11.44 5.83 (1.78) 3.27** 2.33, 9.34 −0.83 (1.00) −0.84
Model: R2 = 0.069, F (3, 556) = 13.75, p < .001
Foreseeability 
NEG (Likert)
0.31 (0.13) 2.34* 0.50, 0.58 0.73 (0.13) 5.46*** 0.47, 1.00 0.17 (0.08) 2.20*
Model: R2 = 0.063, F (3, 549) = 12.21, p < .001
Foreseeability 
POS (Likert)
0.65 (0.17) 3.91*** 0.33, 0.98 0.61 (0.17) 3.66*** 0.28, 0.94 −0.02 (0.09) −0.18
Model: R2 = 0.062, F (3, 556) = 12.14, p < .001
Legal 
responsibility
−0.06 (0.14) −0.42 −0.34, 0.22 0.22 (0.14) 1.57 −0.06, 0.50 0.11 (0.08) 1.41
Model: R2 = 0.005, F (3, 549) = 0.96, p = .41
Benevolence 0.05 (0.11) 0.43 −0.16, 0.25 0.12 (0.11) 1.14 −0.09, 0.33 0.03 (0.06) 0.50
Model: R2 = 0.006, F (3, 556) = 1.18, p = .31
Note: ‘Int. (SE)’ represents the regression weight and standard error for the interaction effects (Outcome Condition × FWB) and ‘Model’ shows the 
statistics for the complete model including the interaction term.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
14  |     STROHMAIER ET Al.
that the relationship between free will beliefs and hindsight and 
outcome bias can, indeed, be explained by blame validation and 
motivated reasoning processes. Due to their tendency to more 
strongly condemn wrongful behavior and to be more punitive, 
those with stronger free will beliefs seem to have been (uncon-
sciously) motivated to arrive at the conclusion that the bankruptcy 
was foreseeable (Studies 1 and 2), that the CEO’s turnaround plan 
was unsatisfactory (Studies 1 and 2), and that the director should 
be held legally responsible (in Study 1).
4.1 | Theoretical and practical implications
The findings of the current research are relevant for several rea-
sons. First, the current research provides further evidence that 
hindsight bias can, indeed, affect legal professionals’ judgments 
in the context of directors’ liability. Our consistent finding (across 
two studies) that legal professionals are affected by outcome in-
formation when evaluating the foreseeability of bankruptcy and 
the company director's actions further confirm the notion that 
merely being an expert in a particular field is insufficient to coun-
ter the influence of hindsight bias. Relatedly, and more important 
for legal practice, it raises the question of what can be done to pre-
vent hindsight bias in these cases. Despite the apparent difficulty 
of debiasing hindsight bias (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975; Hell et al., 1988; 
Pohl & Hell, 1996; Sanna & Schwarz, 2003; Sanna et al., 2002; 
Smith & Greene, 2005), suggestions have been made regarding 
measures that courts could adopt in response to evidence of hind-
sight bias in legal decision making, such as trial bifurcation, raising 
the standard of proof, or not conducting cause investigations at 
all if bankruptcy has limited societal impact or if there is no direct 
suspicion of irregularities in the first place (e.g., Rachlinski, 1998). 
Despite the importance of the issue at hand, we consider a discus-
sion of ways to limit hindsight bias in the courtroom to be beyond 
the scope of the present paper. Nonetheless, we would urge aca-
demics and legal professionals to further pursue the challenge of 
identifying ways to limit or even prevent hindsight bias in legal de-
cision making. An important note to make here is that our experi-
ments identified hindsight bias and outcome bias at the individual 
level and it is, therefore, uncertain to what extent these findings 
will ultimately affect legal decision making in a real-world context. 
That is, legal decisions are not made in isolation but are rather the 
end result of legal procedures in which multiple stakeholders take 
part (e.g., attorneys, prosecutors) and in which the final decision 
is a group decision made by a jury or (multiple) judges. Hence, it is 
possible that erroneous judgments of one or more individuals (es-
pecially those who have strong punitive inclinations) are ultimately 
counteracted in the process due to the input of other parties in-
volved in the bankrupty case. Having said that, as we know, group 
processes (such as groupthink) can also aggravate biases and if a 
dominant person in a jury or the most senior judge has been af-
fected by either hindsight bias or outcome bias, it stands to reason 
there is a high likelihood this will affect the final ruling.
Second, we add to the literature on antecedents of hindsight 
bias and outcome bias by demonstrating that abstract beliefs such 
as whether or not humans have free will can predict susceptibility 
to these biases. Similar to previous research highlighting that situa-
tional factors such as emotional states can influence legal judgments 
(for reviews, see Feigenson, 2016; Feigenson & Park, 2006), our 
finding that (largely) situationally independent individual character-
istics such as belief systems are associated with differences in legal 
judgments is alarming. Ideally, the outcome of a trial is unaffected by 
the individual characteristics of the judge deciding over the matter. 
Likewise, in the case of directors’ liability, it is undesirable that the 
chance of a claim against a director being put forward by a trustee, 
and possibly being granted by a judge, is affected by irrelevant traits 
of the legal professionals involved, such as their belief in free will and 
punitive inclinations. Therefore, the current finding that believing in 
free will is associated with a larger hindsight bias in legal judgments 
is particularly noteworthy and potentially worrying finding. It is cer-
tainly worrying if the need to punish can, indeed, explain the current 
research findings, as this would imply that with increasingly adverse 
outcomes, legal professionals would judge increasingly harsh, pos-
sibly resulting in unjustified liability assigned to (mostly) blameless 
actors. However, as mentioned before, legal decisions are not the 
result of an individual legal professional operating in isolation. It re-
mains an open question, therefore, to what extent free will beliefs 
and punitive inclinations affect decision making in real-world cases.
Finally, we contribute to theory and research on the mechanisms 
underlying hindsight bias and outcome bias. Thus far, the factors 
that have been identified as responsible for the motivational origins 
of hindsight bias are people's need for closure, need for control, and 
the need to maintain or enhance their self-esteem (Musch, 2003; 
Musch & Wagner, 2007; Tykocinski, 2001). The current research is 
the first to suggest (and provide preliminary evidence) that the mo-
tivational processes underlying hindsight and outcome bias can also 
stem from people's need to condemn and punish wrongdoing.
Importantly, we did not directly test punitive inclinations as the 
underlying mechanism of hindsight and outcome bias but rather 
measured free will beliefs as a proxy. However, as alluded to in the 
introduction of this paper, there is ample evidence for the proxi-
mal association between free will beliefs and punitiveness and we, 
therefore, consider free will beliefs to be a useful and valid proxy 
for people's punitive inclinations. The results of Study 2 lent further 
support for the notion that punitive inclinations account for the 
moderating influence of free will beliefs. Here, we did not observe 
a moderating role of free will beliefs in case of a positive outcome, 
which refutes an alternative explanation that can be derived from 
the literature for the observed moderation effect of free will beliefs. 
That is, beliefs regarding free will have been shown to affect causal 
reasoning processes, which are deemed essential for hindsight bias 
to occur. In a series of experiments, Genschow et al. (2017) found 
that a stronger belief in free will is associated with an increase in the 
correspondence bias, which is the automatic inclination to overem-
phasize internal over external factors when evaluating the causes 
of someone's actions (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; also known as the 
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fundamental attribution error; e.g., Ross, 1977). Therefore, those 
with stronger free will beliefs might be more likely to conclude that 
directors are to be held causally responsible (and therefore legally re-
sponsible) for a company's downfall. However, the correspondence 
bias cannot account for all of our findings. That is, correspondence 
bias deals with causal attributions and—on a conceptual level—it can, 
therefore, have an indirect effect on attributions of legal responsibil-
ity (i.e., being causally responsible is a requirement for legal respon-
sibility), but not on judgments of foreseeability or assessments of 
decision quality. Nonetheless, it would be a worthwhile endeavor for 
future research to develop a more direct measure of punitiveness for 
a more comprehensive understanding of the association between 
punitiveness and susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias.
We, therefore, encourage future research to further investigate 
(1) whether people's punitive inclinations can, indeed, explain their 
susceptibility to hindsight bias, (2) how large this potential problem 
actually is in real-world legal practice, and (3) what can be done 
to limit the potential effects of individual characteristics on legal 
judgments.
4.2 | Limitations
The current research is not without its limitations and certain issues 
remain that should be addressed carefully in research following the 
findings presented herein. First, even though we consider our large 
sample of legal professionals from across the globe to be a strength 
of the current research, the pluriformity in the participants’ nation-
alities does pose a few challenges. For example, differences across 
countries exist in legislation concerning directors’ liability and we are 
uncertain to what extent this might have affected participants’ re-
sponses. Unfortunately, in addition to being beyond the scope of the 
current research, our data set does not allow for analyses comparing 
participants from (groups of) different nationalities or jurisdictions, 
as splitting the sample into different groups would result in insuf-
ficient statistical power to detect the effects of interest. The same 
limitation applies to analyses comparing participants with different 
roles in legal procedures. While the samples of the two studies con-
sisted of for example lawyers, judges, and insolvency practitioners, 
group-level analyses are not warranted because of sample size is-
sues. As it is of relevance for legal practice to examine whether the 
observed effects are more or less pronounced for different groups, 
we recommend that future research takes into account the sam-
pling requirements for drawing conclusions about differences across 
groups in the population.
Second, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether the cur-
rent findings can be replicated using different case materials. That 
is, the case concerned a Dutch company with a director who had 
a typically Dutch name (i.e., Cees van Gelder). It might be that for 
some people this triggered certain stereotypes or other automatic 
inclinations toward Dutch directors.
A third limitation of the current study is that when doing exper-
imental research, it is generally difficult to establish whether the 
findings can be generalized to, in this case, real-life court cases and 
how large of an effect it might have in such a real-world context. 
As alluded to earlier, it could be that courtroom dynamics between 
the different parties might ultimately neutralize the biases observed 
in our research. At the same time, there is also the possibility that 
group dynamics aggravate the psychological processes underlying 
biased judgments.
Another issue concerns whether the observed findings can be 
extended beyond the domain of directors’ liability in bankruptcy 
proceedings to for example breach of fiduciary duty tort suits, crim-
inal charges against directors, or to cases that are more high pro-
file with a considerable impact for society. One reason to think that 
the present findings might not generalize to more severe cases (e.g., 
fraud, self-enrichment) is that past a certain threshold of the severity 
of an offense, most people will probably experience a strong need 
to punish the offender, regardless of whether they believe in free 
will or not. Indeed, Krueger and colleagues (2014) have shown that 
when people are asked to punish an offender in a low-affect case 
(e.g., property theft), people believing more strongly in free will pun-
ished harsher than those who were more skeptical of free will. When 
people were asked how harsh they would punish an offender in a 
high-affect case (e.g., murder), no difference based on free will be-
liefs was found. Hence, if it is, indeed, true that free will beliefs can 
predict the degree of hindsight bias due to a higher need to punish 
and resulting motivated cognition on behalf of those with stronger 
free will beliefs, it could be that in high-affect criminal law cases (or 
other more high-affect cases such as a high-profile bankruptcy case 
with severe consequences for society) the moderating role of free 
will beliefs would disappear.
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